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JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE CHARTING
OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY:




Historically, minority participation in entrepreneurial activities in
the United States has, for the most part, been negligible or non-existent.1
In theory, the emancipation of American blacks from slavery2 should
have resulted in increased opportunities for blacks to participate in the
country's industrial development and growth. Although a variety of
"disadvantaged firms" 3 have emerged since the 1970s,l purposefully dis-
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1. See H.R. REP. No. 460, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1987) (finding "that discrimination
and the present effects of past discrimination have hurt socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals in their entrepreneurial endeavors"); H.R. REP. No. 468, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1975) (finding a "long history of racial bias" resulting in "major problems" for
minority-owned businesses).
2. President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, see 6 THE WRIT-
INGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 227 (A. Lapsley ed. 1923), and the Constitution was amended in
1865 to abolish slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (1865). Section I of the thirteenth
amendment reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." Id.
3. Technically, "'disadvantaged' is used to mean an economically disadvantaged [busi-
ness] without considering discrimination." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 101ST CONG.,
1ST SESS., MINORITY BUSINESS SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS: THE CITY OF RICHMOND V. J. A.
CROSON COMPANY, A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES BY CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS AND
ECONOMISTS 78 (Comm. Print 1990). References to disadvantaged businesses throughout this
Article, however, denote references to Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs), Minority
Business Enterprises (MBEs) and Women Business Enterprises (WBEs).
4. See Hearings on the Impact on Minority Businesses of the 1989 Supreme Court Decision
in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Before the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (transcript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
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criminatory schemes ensured the exclusion of blacks and other minorities
from America's free enterprise economy.'
Recognizing the harm caused by long years of discrimination and its
concomitant deprivation of opportunities for minorities, the federal and
state governments established "sheltered market"6 programs.7 These mi-
nority enclaves, or "set-asides," 8 represent goals typically set by partici-
pating government agencies to spend tax dollars on businesses that
traditionally have been excluded from the government contracting pro-
cess.9 Although the goals of such programs may be noble, the results
have been inadequate. 10 For example, even if all participating agencies
met their five or ten percent goal each year, minority contractors would
receive a disproportionately "small" piece of the economic pie."
(statement of Mr. Parren Mitchell, former chairman of the House Small Business Committee
and current chairman of the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MBELDEF)).
5. H.R. RP. No. 460, supra note 1, at 18, 20. "The presumption has been made by past
Congresses and now reaffirmed by this Committee, that discrimination and the present effects
of past discrimination have hurt socially and economically disadvantaged individuals in their
entrepreneurial endeavors. It is a legitimate purpose of government to correct the imbalance
caused by discrimination .... ." Id. at 18.
6. Sheltered markets, as the name suggests, refers to that percentage of contracting op-
portunities that are awarded to minority firms on a non-competitive basis. See Contractors
Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
7. See, eg., Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-650 (1988)); Local Public Works Employment Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1989)); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 19-11-223 (1987) (goods and services); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14838-3(b) (West
1990) (5% procurement and construction); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.042 (West 1990) (15%
construction, contractual services and commodities); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 132.604
(Smith-Hurd 1988) (10% state contracts); IOWA CODE ANN. § 314.14(2) (West 1985) (10%
highway construction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1955(c) (West 1989) (10% goods and serv-
ices); MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 14-302(b)(2)(i) (1988) (10% all state procure-
ment); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.540(52) (Callaghan 1990) (not less than 7% construction, goods
and services); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52 (West 1987) (7% goods, equipment, construction and
services, 15% purchases by casinos); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-28.4(b) (1989) (10% contract
purchases); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 123.151(2)(a) (Anderson 1989) (5% construction);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 85.45c (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (10% goods and services); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 37-14.1-6 (Michie 1990) (10% all state procurement and construction projects);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.855(10m)(a) (West 1986) (5% of total expenditures in fiscal year, 5%
bidding preference).
8. Set-aside programs reserve an amount of public contract funds for disadvantaged busi-
nesses. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., 735 F. Supp. at 1292 n.5.
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1988).
10. See, ag., Haworth, Minority and Women's Business Set-Asides: An Appropriate Re-
sponse to Discrimination? A Partial Response-Poorly Implemented, in SELECTED AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION TOPICS IN EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS SET-ASIDEs 79 (1985).
11. For example, the Minority Business Development Agency reported that:
[I]n fiscal year 1986, total prime contracts approached $185 billion, yet minority
business received only $5 billion in prime contracts, or about 2.7 percent of the prime
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Congress understood that federal procurement was a significant ve-
hicle for promoting and developing minority enterprises and enacted sev-
eral measures to assist minority businesses, including the Small Business
Act12 and the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment
Act of 1976.13 Through section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, amended
in 1958,14 Congress established as policy and required that government
agencies take steps to ensure that a fair share of federal contracting dol-
lars go to minority businesses.'" In particular, the Small Business Act
regulations provided that American citizens who are black, Spanish-
contract dollar. Of that small amount, section 8(a) awards under the Small Business
Act... exceeded three billion dollars or nearly 60 percent of the share of the Federal
purchase dollar awarded to minority firms. Accordingly, there is a high dependence
rate on the section 8(a) program to capture a significantly small share of the Federal
acquisition dollar.
H.R. REP. No. 460, supra note 1, at 18. Therefore, most of the protected contracting oppor-
tunities with the federal government are available through section 8(a) of the United States
Small Business Administration's program. Small Business Act, § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)
(1988). The section 8(a) program requires "direct federal procuring agencies" to provide con-
tracts for which the SBA negotiates with "a socially or economically disadvantaged firm."
Sroka, Minority and Women's Business Set-Asides: An Appropriate Response to Discrimination?,
in SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION Topics IN EMPLOYMENT AND BusINEss SET-ASIDES,
supra note 10, at 90, 92-93.
According to the most recent statistics available, only six percent of all firms are
owned by minorities; less than two percent of minorities own businesses while the
comparable percent for nonminorities is over six percent; and the average receipts
per minority firm is less than 10 percent the average receipts of all businesses.
A review of Federal procurement data reveals a similar pattern of economic
disparity. Small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically dis-
advantaged individuals (most of whom are minority) receive a disproportionately
small share of Federal purchases.
H.R. REP. No. 460, supra note 1, at 18. Most public sector contracting money is not being
spent on minority firms. In fact, public sector programs usually only set small percentage
"goals," not "guarantees," for minority businesspersons. See supra note 7 for documentation
of the fact that federal and state measures generally strive to do only a small percentage of
business with minority firms.
12. Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-650
(1988)). The Act states that social and economic inequalities based on ethnicity exist in our
society; that "it is in the national interest to expeditiously ameliorate [such] conditions"; and,
that the development of small businesses owned by members of specified disadvantaged groups
can significantly contribute to redressing observed inequalities. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (f)(1) (1988).
13. Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-
6710 (1988)).
14. Pub. L. No. 85-536, § 8(a), 72 Stat. 384, 389 (1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)
(1988)).
15. See id. Section 8(a) gave the Small Business Administration (SBA) authority to enter
into contracts with government agencies which it then could subcontract to small businesses.
Id. Through implementing regulations, section 8(a) was initially used for the benefit of small
businesses generally, with contracts being awarded on a competitive basis. See 13 C.F.R.
§ 124.8-1 (1970). Later revisions to the regulations provided social and economic criteria for
section 8(a) eligibility, and thereby eliminated the competition requirement. See 13 C.F.R.
§§ 124.101, .105-.106 (1990).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
speaking, Oriental, Eskimo or Aleut were automatically eligible for mi-
nority programs under the "socially and economically disadvantaged"
criteria.1
6
During the 1970s, some majority businesses challenged, on constitu-
tional grounds, the Small Business Administration (SBA) regulation al-
lowing government agencies to consider race when awarding
construction contracts.1 7 They alleged that administering the program
for the benefit of certain racial and ethnic groups violated the fifth and
fourteenth amendments' guarantee of equal protection. Courts never
adjudicated the merits of the equal protection issue, however, because in
each case the plaintiff lacked standing.'9 Nonetheless, the SBA was suffi-
ciently pressured'0 so that it revised its rules relating to the socially and
economically disadvantaged. The new rules incorporate factors unre-
lated to race or ethnicity and thereby prohibit government agencies from
relying exclusively on race in determining eligibility.2 Despite these at-
tempts to accommodate majority businesses, minorities remain the pro-
gram's primary beneficiaries because government agencies determine
social and economic disadvantage primarily through evidence of depriva-
tion of opportunities due to race. 2
Nevertheless, the section 8(a) program is more of a hope than a pan-
acea, with a consistent record of falling short of its goals.23 Congress
16. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(c) (1977).
17. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974); Massey Servs. v. Fletcher, 348 F. Supp. 171, 175-76 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
18. Ray Baillie, 477 F.2d at 700; Massey Servn, 348 F. Supp. at 174.
19. Ray Baillie, 477 F.2d at 710 (plaintiff never applied to participate and merely had
"generalized interest in the fair administration of the program"); Massey Sers., 348 F. Supp.
at 176 (corporation found not to be small business concern under SBA regulations and conse-
quently lacked standing to maintain action).
20. See Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business Administration 8(a)
Contract Procurement Program, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 249-57 (1976).
21. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.101-.109 (1990).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1988). Social disadvantage can be established by "those
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity
as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." Id. Economic disadvan-
tage can be established by "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete
in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportuni-
ties as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged." Id.
§ 637(a)(6)(A).
23. See S. REP. No. 1070, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 16-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3835, 3848-49, 3851.
Reports prepared by the General Accounting Office and investigations con-
ducted by both the executive and legislative branches have disclosed that the 8(a)
program has fallen far short of its goal to develop strong and growing disadvantaged
small businesses. Only 33 of the more than 3700 firms which have participated in the
[Vol. 24:655
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established the program not as a set-aside, but as a mechanism for the
encouragement, creation and development of long-term minority busi-
ness enterprises to survive and compete once they graduate from the pro-
gram.2 4 The 8(a) program, however, retains a checkered history of
political uses25 and abuses26 and is still struggling to achieve its original
program have both completed the 8(a) program and are known to have a positive net
worth.
Id. at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3438. These findings are
further buttressed by Senator Bumper's statement made when introducing the proposed Mi-
nority Business Development Program Reform Act of 1988:
"The 8(a) program, established to assist the development of minority and disadvan-
taged businesses by providing Federal contracts and business development resources
to these firms, has been crippled by fraud and mismanagement... yet the program
retains great promise as a tool to strengthen disadvantaged businesses and provide
greater economic opportunity if corrective measures are taken to restore the integrity
of the program."
SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, BusINESS OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPMENT REFORM
AcT OF 1988, S. REP. No. 394, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5401, 5414.
24. S. REP. No. 1070, supra note 23, at 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3850.
[Tihe development of small business ownership among socially and economically dis-
advantaged persons has been a very slow process and.., it is in the national interest
to expeditiously improve this condition. The fact that minority small businesses have
had an especially difficult time in fully participating in the economic system is also
recognized. It finds, therefore, that the procurement authority under section 8(a) of
the Small Business Act should be used only for developing minority and other so-
cially and economically disadvantaged businesses. The purpose of the 8(a) program
is to foster the development of socially and economically disadvantaged businesses
and to promote the competitive viability of these businesses by providing necessary
contract, financial, technical and management assistance.
Id.
25. In late 1968 the program was used to quell urban unrest by channelling contracts to
firms in inner cities; as an employment device in poverty stricken areas; as a contracting vehi-
cle for "disadvantaged" small businesses not owned by minority or disadvantaged individuals;
and to promote the particular Administration's political agenda which usually meant subordi-
nating business development to some other priority. See SENATE COMM. ON SMALL Busi-
NESS, supra note 23, at 1-2, 28-29, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5401-04 (legislative history and purpose of program).
26. Probably the most notorious case of abuse was the highly publicized "Wedtech scan-
dal." See id. at 36-37, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5412. In
reviewing Wedtech's eligibility for the 8(a) program and its award of two major contracts in
1982 and 1984, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee investigated the White House, Navy, Army and Small Busi-
ness Administration. Id. at 36, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5412.
That investigation revealed that Wedtech did not qualify as minority or disadvantaged, and the
contracts award process was controlled by unethical conduct, favoritism, political influence,
mismanagement, and improper and irregular decision-making of federal employees and agen-
cies. Id. at 36-37, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5412. The Senate
Report on the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988 noted that the
Wedtech scandal has "provided the public, the Courts and the Congress with an appalling
spectacle of greed, fraud and abuse in both industry and government. The [scandal] ... has
undermined public confidence in government at the highest levels and threatens to erode pub-
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purposes and goals.
Congress established another program to assist minority business
enterprises in the 1970s under the Local Public Works Capital Develop-
ment and Investment Act of 1976.27 There, Congress required grantees
of federal construction money to ensure ten percent minority participa-
tion in each project.28 Majority contractors subsequently challenged this
requirement, contending it was unconstitutional because it was not predi-
cated on specific findings of discrimination.29 The ten percent require-
ment was upheld in the federal courts30 based on congressional findings
of discrimination. 31 These findings indicated that this minority participa-
tion program was remedial and therefore constitutional.32
Equal protection challenges to federal programs designed to assist
minority businesses continued in Fullilove v. Klutznick.3 At issue in
Fulliove was a ten percent Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) set-aside
program established through the Public Works Employment Act of
1977.31 In upholding this program, the Supreme Court found that con-
gressional findings of nationwide discrimination in the construction in-
dustry justified the creation of a federal minority preference program. 5
Since Fullilove, challenges to economic practices designed to benefit mi-
norities have increased in scope and intensity.
3 6
This Article explores the constitutionality, and desirability of shel-
tered markets for minority entrepreneurs. It suggests that the Supreme
Court is charting economic policy via the Constitution and notes that the
lie commitment to the purposes of the [8(a)] program." Id. at 2, reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5403. In addition, the 8(a) program was misused by majority firms
that generally were ineligible to participate, but secured 8(a) contracting opportunities by us-
ing minority contractors as "fronts" for their operation. See, e.g., Taylor, Minority Contract
System Critics Blame Government, L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 1; Hurst & Taylor,
Fraction of Indian Blood Worth Millions in Business, L.A. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
Fronts remain a concern for legitimate minority contractors seeking business opportunities.
27. Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710
(1988)).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988).
29. Wright Farms Constr. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023, 1039 (D. Vt. 1977). The equal
protection clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, proscribes discrimination
even for the benefit of disadvantaged minorities unless specific findings have been made to
support a remedial effort. Wright Farms Constr., 444 F. Supp. at 1037.
30. See, eg., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 366 (D.R.I. 1978).
31. Id. at 352-55.
32. Id. at 363-64; Wright Farms Constr., 444 F. Supp. at 1037.
33. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
34. Id. at 453-54 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1977)).
35. !d at 478.
36. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the challenges to mi-
nority business protection programs.
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Constitution lends itself readily to minority protective economic legisla-
tion. Further, it considers the protection afforded majority businesses
when they are disadvantaged in the marketplace, and attempts to recon-
cile the legitimacy of such protection versus that afforded minority
businesses.
II. CURRENT CASE LAW ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a lo-
cal government affirmative action program in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.3 7 Croson dealt with a city ordinance which required prime
contractors who were awarded city construction contracts to subcontract
at least thirty percent of the dollar value of such contracts to one or more
minority businesses.38 In order for a business to qualify as a "minority"
enterprise, the ordinance required the firm to be owned and controlled "
by members of certain ethnic groups.' Black, Hispanic, Oriental, Native
Americans, Eskimo and Aleut Americans were eligible candidates.41 If
the prime contractor could not identify a qualified minority subcontrac-
tor, the minority participation requirements were waived.42
In the Croson case, J.A. Croson, a majority contractor, applied for
and was denied a waiver from the minority enterprise requirement for its
bid on a city construction project.43 After bidding the project, the city
awarded it to another contractor and Croson sued contending that the
37. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Although Croson involved racial classifications established
through a legislative process, id. at 477-78, its principles are applicable to all racial classifica-
tions by private or public bodies. The decision's impact may, therefore, reach employment and
promotion plans, university admission policies, and even court-ordered remedial schemes.
Gender-based schemes intended to remedy the effects of discrimination against women were
not addressed in Croson. See id. at 493.
38. Id. at 477.
39. The "owned and controlled" requirement was incorporated into legislation or ordi-
nances establishing contracting programs to protect against past or projected minority abuses
by majority firms. See id. at 530 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the deceptive
process of creating "fronts" in order to obtain contracting opportunities intended for minori-
ties, see supra note 25.
40. Croson, 488 U.S. at 478.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 478-79. Many majority contractors view the "qualified" requirement as an
"out" rather than a mechanism to ensure that competent minority firms are used. See Hear-
ings, supra note 4 (statement of Mr. Parren Mitchell). In that spirit, many majority contrac-
tors routinely attempt to obtain a waiver without making any meaningful attempts to identify
a qualified minority firm. Id
43. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483.
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city plan violated the equal protection clause.' Both the trial and appel-
late courts upheld the plan as constitutional.45 The appellate court's de-
cision, however, was remanded for consideration in light of Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,46 where the Court had held that race-con-
scious remedies must be measured by the strict scrutiny standard47 and
supported by specific evidence of discrimination.48 On remand, the court
of appeals determined that the Plan was unconstitutional because the city
did not rely on "prior discrimination by the government unit" as justifi-
cation for enacting a race-conscious set-aside law.49
On rehearing, the Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's rea-
soning, noting that the court had misread Wygant.5 0 The Croson Court
noted that Wygant does not simply require a governmental unit to show
44. Id.
45. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1985). The circuit
court relied on the standards outlined in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), where the
Court had upheld a federal MBE program premised on national findings of past discrimination
in the construction industry. Croson, 779 F.2d at 187. After considering national and local
findings of discrimination the court concluded that the Richmond Plan was reasonable and
therefore constitutional. Id at 194. The Supreme Court went on to disagree with the circuit
court's reliance on Fulilove, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 491, but has still not drawn a bright line in
this area.
46. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
47. Id. at 273-74.
48. Id. at 276. Wygant was a suit brought by tenured white professors who were laid off
under a collective bargaining agreement that protected less senior minority teachers over more
senior majority teachers. Id. at 270-71. The layoff agreement entered into between the Board
of Education and the teachers' union was designed to increase the number of minority teachers
in the school system. Id. at 272. The white professors claimed that the School Board's deci-
sion to lay them off and retain less senior minority teachers violated the equal protection
clause. Id. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that any racial preference or race-
conscious remedy must be measured by the strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 274. The prefer-
ence must, therefore, serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to address the
problem. Id. Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, found that the reliance on societal, as
opposed to specific, evidence of discrimination was too amorphous to support the layoff of
innocent people. Id. at 276.
Members of the Court generally agreed that an affirmative action plan is permissible if the
local government has a history of racial discrimination. See id. at 274, 295 (White, J., concur-
ring); id. at 297 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There was also a general consensus that the locality
need not convince a court that its prior discrimination rose to the level of a constitutional or
statutory violation. See id. at 274-75; id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 303-06
(Marshall J., dissenting). There is, however, disagreement between the Justices as to exactly
what type of evidence is needed to justify a locality's administrative conclusion of discrimina-
tion and its consequent affirmative action plan. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (plurality's position that race conscious remediation need not be condi-
tioned on showing of prima facie title VII violation).
49. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 488
U.S. 469 (1989).
50. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
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prior discriminatory acts in order to adopt a remedial race-conscious
plan,"1 but that such plans must also satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis
because they involve racial classification. 2 Consequently, a set-aside
plan would be upheld only if the city could demonstrate that it satisfied a
compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.53
Remedying "societal" discrimination, the Court noted, would not suffice
as a compelling interest, 4 which is present only when raciil discrimina-
tion has been specifically identified.5
In applying this standard, the Croson Court found that the city of
Richmond did not present evidence of identified discrimination in the
construction industry.56 Furthermore, the Court found that the Plan
was not narrowly tailored because it was not linked to identified discrimi-
nation, and it gave minority entrepreneurs in Richmond an absolute pref-
erence over other citizens solely on the basis of their race.57 In addition,
the Court found that the city had randomly included racial groups for
coverage, thereby making the Plan overinclusive.55 The Court deter-
mined that the Plan was, in effect, an attempt at racial balancing.59 Fur-
ther, the fact that the city had failed to consider race-neutral
alternatives-such as helping minority entrepreneurs raise capital and
meet bonding requirements-also contributed to the Court's finding that
the Plan was not tailored to meet the city's goals.'
The Croson Court, however, did not explicitly strike a death blow to
minority entrepreneurs.61 Since Croson, at least two lower court deci-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 493.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 498-99.
55. Id. at 504. This standard, however, relates to voluntary affirmative action plans only.
Id. A court-ordered affirmative action plan, may need to satisfy strict scrutiny, but the Court
has thus far left it an open question. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67
(1987).
56. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-08. The Court also found that Richmond had improperly
relied on conclusory statements alleging discrimination by councilpersons in adopting the af-
firmative action plan; failed to show how many qualified minority firms were in the relevant
market; failed to show that low minority membership in the contractors' trade associations
was due to discrimination; and improperly relied on congressional findings of national discrim-
ination in the industry. Id. at 498-505.
57. Id. at 507.
58. Id. at 506.
59. Id. at 507.
60. Id.
61. See Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, 1712 (1989). Those commentators
noted:
In light of the Supreme Court's January 1989 decision in City of Richmond v. J.A.
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sions have demonstrated that set-aside plans can pass constitutional
muster.62
Other decisions refusing to halt or dismantle challenged programs
have also been encouraging. 63 In reality, however, the Court has cut off
the life blood of minority entrepreneurs and jeopardized approximately
236 state and local set-aside programs with Croson. 6  In the wake of
Croson, numerous lower courts have struck down challenged plans,
65
Croson Co., some have recently argued that race-conscious remedies by local and
state governments should be regarded as conflicting with the Constitution. As long-
time students of constitutional law, we regard this assessment as wrong. The
Supreme Court has insisted that affirmative action programs be carefully designed-
not dismantled. A call for fairness and flexibility in affirmative action programs
should never be equated with a call for retrenchment and retreat. It would defy not
only the Supreme Court's decisions but the fundamental purposes of the equal pro-
tection clause to conclude that the Constitution forbids all such inclusive remedial
measures, or requires that such measures be treated in exactly the same way as the
invidious discrimination of the nation's past.
Therefore, while it would be irresponsible for local governments to avoid
whatever steps are necessary to adjust their minority contract programs to the
Supreme Court's ruling in the Croson decision, it would be equally irresponsible for
others to claim that this opinion casts doubt on the overall constitutionality of prop-
erly constructed race-conscious remedies.
Id. at 1712. But see Fried, Affinnative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A
Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 160-61 (1989) (Croson's greatest im-
portance "is the unequivocal affirmation that the Equal Protection clause protects all equally"
therefore strict scrutiny is applied to all quotas save those remedying identified acts of
discrimination).
62. See Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (W.D. Wash. 1989)
(county set-aside program for minority and women-owned business held narrowly tailored to
remedy identified past discrimination in construction industry); State v. Taylor, Nos. 36,709-
36,714, slip op. at 16-18 (Anne Arundel County Ct., Md., Aug. 14, 1990) (Maryland MBE
statute satisfies requirements of equal protection clause because it is supported by statistical
data, does not set quotas and is revised annually).
63. See, eg., Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 516 (1990) (reversing summary judgment invalidating county's program); North-
eastern Fla. Chapter v. Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing preliminary
injunction prohibiting enforcement of municipality's set-aside ordinance).
64. Letter from Tyrone D. Press, Chief, Investigation and Research, Office of Chief Coun-
sel for the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund (MBELDEF), to
Mamie Carlin, Articles Editor, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (Jan. 10, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter MBELDEF Research] (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (discussing re-
search compiled by the MBELDEF from verbal and written correspondence with various
sources). In addition to state legislative initiatives, over 150 localities established programs
which constitute the bulk of available contracting opportunities. Id.
65. See Michigan Rd. Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489
U.S. 1061 (1989) (holding Michigan lacked compelling governmental interest for its MBE
program); Main Line Paving v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding
that program was only supported by generalized findings of discrimination and failed to focus
on discrimination in local construction industry; that there was absence of specific evidence of
discrimination against beneficiaries of program; program was not narrowly tailored; race- and
gender-neutral alternatives were not considered; and remedies not limited to identified vic-
tims); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Wis.) (enjoining
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while other plans are still being litigated. 6 Even plaintiffs without stand-
ing have joined in the fray,67 and mootness of the issue has not deterred
challenges.6 Additionally, some jurisdictions have viewed Croson as a
clear statement that set-asides are no longer legally acceptable and there-
fore should be abolished. 9 Other jurisdictions have suspended or other-
wise modified their programs by reducing goals or allowing only
"voluntary" approaches.7" Some localities are currently reviewing an-
other group of programs.7 1 The economic impact of Croson on minor-
state program which could not meet Croson's strict scrutiny standard, but modified on basis of
state program being subsidiary of federal DBE program not subject to Croson's tough stan-
dards; state funded projects remain enjoined), modifying 707 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Wis. 1989);
L.D. Mattson, Inc. v. Multnomah County, 703 F. Supp. 66 (D. Ore. 1988) (county's MBE and
WBE programs struck down as unsupported by findings of discrimination and not narrowly
tailored due to inadequate consideration of less restrictive alternatives); American Subcontrac-
tors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662, 665-67 (Ga. 1989) (Atlanta's MBE program held
unconstitutional because there was no evidence of discrimination, no consideration of race-
neutral remedies and was overinclusive in its coverage of ethnic groups).
66. See United Fence & Guardrail Corp. v. Cuomo, 878 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1989) (re-
manded for consideration on merits after district judge abstained from exercising jurisdiction
and deferred to state court resolution of same suit); American Sewer Servs. v. Bolden, No. 90-
C-872 (E.D. Wis. filed Aug. 31, 1990); F. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, No.
1:90CV1067 (N.D. Ohio fied June 19, 1990); John R. Jurgensen Co. v. City of Dayton, No.
C3-89-295 (S.D. Ohio filed July 19, 1989); Association of Gen. Contractors v. City of New
Haven, No. N89-303 PCD (D. Conn. filed June 26, 1989); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v.
Philadelphia, No. 89-2737 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 14, 1989); Concrete Gen. v. Washington Sub-
urban Sanitary Comm., No. MJG 88-1356 (D. Md. fied May 11, 1988).
67. See, e.g., Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1989); Capeletti Bros. v.
Broward County, 738 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
68. See, eg., Reynolds v. Montgomery County, Ohio, No. C-3-89-423, slip op. at 1 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 27, 1990) (suit by contractor against 'county alleging affirmative action plan uncon-
stitutional because it accorded minority- and women-owned businesses preference for county
contracts); Illinois Rd. Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, No. 90C0623 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 2,
1990) (suit by contractors against city alleging affirmative action provisions violate fourteenth
amendment by according racial and ethnic minorities and women preference in bid process).
69. Colorado, Minnesota (city of Minneapolis), North Carolina (city of Durham and
Guilford County), Oregon (Portland Public Schools, Salem County and Lane County) and
Virginia (Richmond School Board and Richmond Redevelopment Housing Authority) are ex-
amples. MBELDEF Research, supra note 64.
70. Barnett, In Richmond's Wake, MINoRrrY Bus. ENTERPRISE, Jan.- Feb. 1990, at 10,
10 (By the end of 1989, the year of the Croson decision "15 municipal minority set aside
programs had been suspended.... ."); see, eg., Delaware (city of Wilmington and New Castle
County), Florida (city of Fort Lauderdale), Indiana (city of South Bend), Illinois (Greater
Chicago Water Reclamation District), Michigan (Genesee County), New Jersey (New Jersey
Port Authority) and New York (New York Port Authority). MBELDEF Research, supra
note 64. The City of Yakima, Washington, is currently seeking suspension of its program. Id.
71. See programs in the following jurisdictions: Arizona (Maricopa County); California
(city of Hayward, city and county of Los Angeles, city of San Jose, city of Oakland, and
Contra Costa and Alameda Counties); Colorado (city of Denver); Florida (Dade County, city
of Ft. Myers, Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, Hillsborough County, Jacksonville, Or-
ange County, Palm Beach County, St. Petersburg, Tampa, and Tallahassee); Georgia (Atlanta
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ity businesspersons will run into billions of dollars, both directly72 and
through the rippling effect on minority employment.73
For now, minority entrepreneurs are essentially left only with the
federal sheltered market. The Croson decision suggests that not only
does the federal government have greater authority and responsibility
than state governments to deal with this issue, but that it also has some
and Fulton County); Illinois (Chicago, Chicago Board of Education, Greater Chicago Water
Reclamation District); Maryland (city of Baltimore, Prince George's County, Prince George's
County Board of Education, Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission and
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission); Minnesota (city of St. Paul); Missouri (St.
Louis); New Jersey (Atlantic City, city of Newark); New York (New York, Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, city of Rochester, and city of Syracuse); North Carolina (Durham
County); Ohio (Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton and Montgomery County); Texas (city of Dal-
las, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Authority, Dallas Area Rapid Transit, City of San Antonio);
Washington State (King County, Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Pierce County, Pierce
Transit, city of Tacoma, Tacoma School District, Metropolitan Park District, Port of Seattle,
Seattle Metro, Seattle School District); Wisconsin (city of Milwaukee, county of Milwaukee
and Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewage District). MBELDEF Research, supra note 64.
72. A survey of a few jurisdictions' spending illuminates what is at stake. From 1982 to
1988 minority businesses in Atlanta received over $200 million in revenues from public sector
contracting. Id. In 1988 alone, MBE's received approximately 34.5% of the $55 million ex-
pended by the city. Id. In Chicago the aviation industry alone expended over $307 million on
minority contractors for the years 1985 through 1989. Id. In 1989, minority firms in Philadel-
phia obtained approximately 25% or $61.9 million from city contract awards. Id. Washing-
ton, D.C. spent $233 million on minority firms in 1988. Id. From 1982 to 1989, black
contractors in Dade County Florida received 3.8% or $44 million in contracting opportunities.
Id One need only do simple addition to figure out what is at stake here. Data from the city of
Richmond itself bears out the economic magnitude of the Croson decision. Specifically, in
January 1989 contracts and purchase order awards to minority contractors hovered just above
11%. Id. By November 1989 awards dropped to just over 6%. Id. The city also spent $9.3
million during the same period on construction contracts. Id. Of this sum, minorities shared
13%. Id. This is in sharp contrast to the 40% participation minorities enjoyed in prior years
under the Richmond Plan. Id. In fact, when the Richmond Plan was first rejected by the
lower court in 1987, J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1356 (4th Cir.
1987), aff'd, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), participation dropped from 40% to 15% and then on to an
all-time low of less than 3% during the first six months of 1988. MBELDEF Research, supra
note 64. In Tampa, Florida, minorities saw their participation level drop from 22% for the
1988 fiscal year to 5.2% during the first quarter of 1989 after their 25% goal was suspended.
Id Total contract awards dropped by 99% for black firms and 50% for hispanic firms. Id.
Hillsborough County Florida's minority contracting program was struck down in 1989. Cone
Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 723 F. Supp. 669, 678 (N.D. Fla. 1989), rev'd, 908 F.2d 908
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990). Following the program's termination, the
county saw a 99% decrease in minority contracting opportunities. MBELDEF Research,
supra note 64.
73. In Atlanta alone, minority firms employ more than 7200 individuals, most of whom
are black. See Barnett, Just the Facts Ma'am, MINORITY Bus. ENTERPRISE, Jan.-Feb. 1990,
at 22, 23. Blacks represent about 60% of the population and a significant part of the
workforce, particularly in the construction industry. Id. One black-owned construction com-
pany has already reported laying off 20% of its work force due to revenue losses. Id.
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special or unique expertise in dealing with discrimination.'
B. Federal/State Distinction
Although the Richmond Plan at issue in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co." was modeled after the congressional ten percent set-aside
program that was upheld in Fulllove v. Klutznick76 it did not pass con-
stitutional muster.7 7 The Croson Court distinguished the two plans pri-
marily on the basis of the "nature and authority" of the acting
governmental body.78  It noted that congressional authority under the
commerce clause79 and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 0 is
unique and broad.8" As a result, congressional reliance on generalized
data of discrimination in the construction industry, in conjunction with
Congress' experience under the Small Business Administration's 8(a)
program, was sufficient in Fullilove to justify a plan that remedied the
effects of past discrimination.82
74. The Croson Court distinguished the remedial powers of Congress and its authority to
implement remedial schemes in upholding the fourteenth amendment from those enjoyed by
the city. Croson, 488 U.S. at 489-90. In this regard, the Court mentioned the legislative his-
tory and findings that led to the establishment of the 8(a) program under the Small Business
Act. Id. at 488. To suggest that the ability to remedy known discrimination falls into a cate-
gory of federal or non-federal expertise is to engage in legal calisthenics. See id. at 487-88.
There has never been any question, and it has been well documented, that discrimination is
responsible for the paucity and weakness of minority entrepreneurs in America. H.R. REP.
No. 460, supra note 1, at 18; H.R. REP. No. 468, supra note 1, at 1-2. The federal government
acted to remediate the problem, not because of special expertise, but because it Was in the
national interest. H.R. RP. No. 460, supra note 1, at 20. State and local governments fol-
lowed with their own programs that in some instances paralleled federal programs. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text. In light of this, one would think that state and local reliance on
federal findings would be given great weight if one were to buy the "federal expertise" argu-
ment. After all, Congress' findings that were the predicate for federal programs, related to the
same majority individuals, firms, and organizations that pursue and hold hostage state and
local contracting opportunities. See, eg., Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (Richmond used congres-
sional findings of discrimination in construction industry and Court found those findings insuf-
ficient for local use).
75. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
76. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
77. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
78. Id. at 489. This distinction was intended to demonstrate that all parties should have
been on notice that Fullhlove was not controlling for race-based remedial schemes other than
those established by the federal government. See Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 474
(1987) (Fullilove clearly focused on the congressionally mandated set-aside program). It also
gave the Croson Court a way to uphold Fullilove but strike down the plan in Croson.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ("To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes.").
80. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. ("Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 487-88.
82. Id. at 488.
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the Croson Court, remarked that by
contrast, state and local governments have no constitutional mandate
similar or equal to section 5 to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
8 3
Rather, she stated, section 1 of the fourteenth amendment took power
away from the states and gave it to Congress. 4 States must operate
within that relinquishment of power, O'Connor stated. 5 Consequently,
section 1 restrictions require more stringent judicial review for state-cre-
ated programs.86 Based on this distinction, the Court concluded that the
findings Congress must make to establish race-based remedial schemes
differ greatly from those findings that state and local governments must
make. 7 The net result is that states must make their own specific find-
ings of discrimination within the profession and jurisdiction in which
they are trying to remediate, and cannot merely rely on congressional
findings of discrimination in that industry. 8 The local findings must also
show that the particular minority groups benefitting from the program
suffered discrimination. 9 Justice O'Connor rationalized her result by
suggesting that even without affirmative action programs, white contrac-
tors will hire minority firms;9° that the paucity of minority firm member-
ship in local contractors' associations may have been due to "career and
entrepreneurial choices;" 91 and that minority contractors' limited access
(0.67%) to the city's contracting opportunities may be a product of "bu-
reaucratic inertia" as opposed to discrimination. 92
Of course, O'Connor's opinion outlines a perfect strategy to put mi-
norities in the position of a dog chasing its tail. All the time and money
previously and currently being spent documenting discrimination 93
83. Id. at 490.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 469.
87. Id. at 498-506. The Court did not articulate what evidentiary requirements are im-
posed on Congress to establish a factual predicate for a set-aside program. See id. at 488-89
(referring to evidence of nationwide history of past discrimination deemed sufficient in Fulli-
love). However, some quantum of proof appears to be necessary. See id. The spectrum ranges
from general evidence of discrimination against minorities nationally, to specific evidence of
previous or current discrimination by the body utilizing a remedial scheme. See id. (past
societal discrimination deemed sufficient for congressionally set quotas while state entities
must show specific evidence of identified past or present discrimination).
88. Id. at 499, 504.
89. Id. at 506.
90. Id. at 502.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Id. at 510.
93. On May 9, 1990, the first of a series of hearings to assess the nature and extent of
discrimination against minority businesses, and to determine what the federal response should
be, began before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Oper-
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translates into time and money lost in contracting opportunities.
The Croson Court further found that the city's failure to consider
"race neutral alternatives" made the Richmond Plan even more prob-
'lematic."4 It suggested as such alternatives, the "[s]implification of bid-
ding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training and
financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races .... ,,5 The
Court noted that even when the federal government was acting in Fulli-
love, race-neutral alternatives were considered and rejected prior to the
ations. See Hearings, supra note 4. Joshua I. Smith, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
the Maxima Corporation, one of the few successful black firms, stated that:
Because many black owned businesses began during the era of racial segregation,
they had no access to the larger and more lucrative white markets. Businesses that
depend on black customers alone face a market where potential customers have only
60% of the income and one-third of the wealth of white customers. In addition, the
abolition of Jim Crow laws did not eliminate the difficulties black businesses face in
breaking through entrenched customer-supplier relationships and overcoming deeply
held negative stereotypes.
Id. E. Mitchell Sr., founder of an Atlanta based construction firm, commented, among other
things, on the issue of bonding:
We would get projects with the City, but surety companies wouldn't bond us. Bond-
ing became the barrier we had to handle and frankly, we haven't jumped over that
yet.... We essentially bond ourselves to meet insurance requirements. For instance,
we put up a $300,000 letter of credit to get a job of $8 million.
We joint venture with white firms not because we need to be apprentices like
some smaller black construction firms, but because we need their bonding capacity.
One of the white-owned construction firms we've joint ventured with is about the
same size as our firm, and it was founded at about the same time.... Conditions of
the joint venture are such that we exchange financial statements and this is what we
found out. This majority firm we work with is bonded at $30 million. The largest
bond that E.R. Mitchell has ever obtained is $4 million, and our bonding capacity
today is $4 million, one-seventh of that of this comparable white construction firm.
Heck, I thought, maybe we've just been dealing with the wrong folks. So we went to
our joint venture partner's bonding company. We were flatly turned down.
Id.
The statements provided by the minority contractors reflected similar experiences, and
also highlighted the need for a regulatory scheme to control discriminatory bonding practices.
See id. (unpublished testimony of E. Mitchell, Sr., founder and former president of E. Mitchell
Construction Co.). There is also a sense that majority contractors submit bids at lower rates
than they can actually perform, with the implicit understanding that they will be allowed
"add-ons" when difficulties arise in performing at the contract price. It is possible that minor-
ity contractors, however, are typically held to the contract price so they cannot afford to un-
derbid projects.
94. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. The Croson Court has now made consideration of race-neu-
tral alternatives a "prerequisite" for the implementation of a plan. This requirement decreases
the likelihood that plans will survive Court scrutiny. In the past, alternative remedies were
just one of many factors the Court considered in determining whether a plan was "narrowly
tailored." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-11; Vulcan Soc. of N.Y. City Fire Dep't v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1973). As a result, this consideration did not take on
a preeminent importance. The only solace in this development is that the governmental body
is not required to experiment with, or try possible alternatives, but only "consider" them.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
95. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10.
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implementation of a plan.9 6
On paper, the Court's suggestions seem meaningful. In fact, the
Court misses the point. The Croson Court seemed to think that relaxa-
tion of the bonding requirements and simplification of the bidding proce-
dures were race-neutral alternatives that would remedy minorities'
inability to get construction contracts.97 The real problem, however, is a
system of control and favoritism between the letting agencies and major-
ity contractors.9" Before contracts were publicized in trade journals, mi-
norities were not even aware of their existence because the letting
agencies purposefully deprived minorities of this information.99 Even
though most public contracts are public information now, the awarding
practices strongly suggest that the advertising procedure is merely pro
forma,oo
C. The Return to Lochnerism
The economic fallout of City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 101 is
that the interests of blacks and other minorities now fall into a low cate-
gory on the Court's list of priorities. Using an old tactic, the Court will-
ingly concedes the wrong meted out to minorities, l"2 but on the issue of
who must right it, the answer is-not us! The explanation given for the
Court's roll-back is "constraints of the constitution."10 3 The reasoning
proffered is that a law which uses race as a factor in decision-making
forces the Court to review that decision in the most searching way."°
96. Id. at 507.
97. Id. at 509-10.
98. Hearings, supra note 4 (testimony of E. Mitchell).
99. Id. (testimony of E. Mitchell).
100. Id (testimony of Parren Mitchell).
101. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See supra note 72 for a discussion of the economic fallout of
Croson.
102. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. The Croson Court seems always willing to concede the
country's sad history of discrimination. For example, Justice O'Connor notes that "there is no
doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country has
contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs ... ." Id. Additionally, Justice
Scalia notes, "It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered discrimination immea-
surably greater than any directed at other racial groups." Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring);
accord Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278 (1986) ("No one disputes that there
has been race discrimination in this country."); see also General Bldg. Contractors v. Penn-
sylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1982) (holding that suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) require
proof of discriminatory intent, notwithstanding Court's recognition that principal object of
legislation was eradication of discriminatory laws and conduct reminiscent of slavery).
103. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6 (1987).
104. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. The tight standards of review being applied in the govern-
ment contracting arena have their genesis in the Court's employment decisions. See, eg., Wy-
gant, 476 U.S. 267 (school board's protection of African-American teachers from layoffs held
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This jurisprudential posture offends the original purpose of the four-
teenth amendment which was essentially concerned with racial equal-
ity °5 and ensuring opportunities for material self-development." 6
Croson represents a continuing stingy attitude in formulating equal pro-
tection doctrine as it relates to minorities, despite the Court's history of
not being similarly constrained in fleshing out other aspects of the four-
teenth amendment10 7 and the Constitution generally. 08
At the turn of this century, the Court shaped and defined economic
policy by using the Constitution to thwart progressive state legislation.
In Lochner v. New York,"oo the Court elevated freedom of contract to the
status of a fundamental right.110 In Lochner, the Court invalidated a
state regulation that limited the number of hours bakers could work on a
daily or weekly basis, on the ground that the regulation violated the con-
unconstitutional because not an appropriate means to meet compelling state interest); Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (district must compare percentage of
blacks in employer's work ranks with percentage of qualified black labor force in determining
underrepresentation in teaching positions). A heightened standard of proof for minorities be-
gan when the court withdrew from a broad reading of fair employment laws. See Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (holding that remedial provisions of title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), empower courts to order race conscious relief under narrowly confined
circumstances). Specifically, the factual predicate upon which the public entity can rely for an
affirmative action program was enunciated prior to Croson, in Johnson, where the employer's
affirmative action plan was upheld, partly because its remedial measures were based on specific
versus generalized population statistics. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634-37. Public employers there-
fore should reasonably conclude that if standards from the employment context are applicable
to public contracting, the converse may also be true.
105. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (amendment intended to
protect class of citizens who were slighted when the Constitution was framed and ratified).
106. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., st Sess. 474 (1866) (purpose of amendment was to
secure rights granted by Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988)), and grant equal opportunity for material self-development
and equal standing before the law).
107. Equal protection has been the source of rights in the concepts of privacy and funda-
mental liberty. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1971) (family); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
108. For example, the right to privacy is a far more attenuated outgrowth of the Bill of
Rights than economic protection for minorities is of the equal protection clause. See, eg.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965) (establishing right to privacy as penum-
bra of several enumerated constitutional rights). Using its own sense of values, the Court has
demonstrated its versatility with the free speech clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, eg.,
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial
speech granted constitutional protection); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscene
speech unprotected). It should also be noted that the Court blames the Constitution for creat-
ing these constraints on affirmative action while using it readily to promote the economic
agenda of majority groups. See, eg., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (use of
fourteenth amendment to promote principles of economic liberty).
109. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
110. Id. at 53.
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tractual freedom of employers and employees."' The Court was able to
reach this result through its own interpretation of the "liberty" element
of the fourteenth amendment, despite the fact that the framers left this
provision undefined. 12
After decimating the state's ability to respond to popular will
through protective legislation, the Court pronounced that liberty of con-
tract is not absolute.1 3 Croson has left similarly cramped space for
states to operate in structuring set-aside programs. While declaring that
its decision did not represent an absolute prohibition of state and local
programs,1 1 4 the Court simultaneously instituted standards that are vir-
tually impossible to meet. The Court in Croson, like in Lochner, deferred
to federal affirmative action legislation,"' even though it was in many
respects identical to that of the states." 6 By limiting states to acting in
purely local matters," 7 the Lochner Court severely curtailed the states'
ability to participate in protective legislative schemes that negatively af-
fect business interests." 8
111. Id. at 64.
112. Id. at 53.
113. Id. (discussing police powers of state to enforce health and safety laws).
114. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509. While the opportunity for material self development can be
traced directly to the fourteenth amendment, see supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text,
antitrust protection has its genesis in the commerce clause, U.S. CONsT., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. This
constitutional provision gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and has
been interpreted to provide the basis for regulating monopolies and other trade practices
through the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 183 (1908); Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337 (1904). This use of "implied" versus apparent
power to legislate in a specific area, places antitrust analysis in the penumbra, see Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), while
affirmative action schemes are directly traceable to the fourteenth amendment.
115. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490; see Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 (stating there must be material
danger to health before state can interfere with right to contract).
116. See, e-g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612
(1911).
117. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61-64.
118. After Lochner, the Court went further and began applying legislation intended to regu-
late business of labor unions. Notwithstanding legislative initiatives to curtail the Court's per-
ceived hostility to workers, the Court continued to protect business interests by issuing
injunctive relief. See, eg., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (grant-
ing injunction against union boycott of employer on ground that Clayton and Sherman Acts
forbid employee boycotts and strikes as a legal restraint of trade).
In response, Congress passed the Norris-La Guardia Act which included a section that
curtailed the courts' use of the injunction against unions. Ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1988)). The Supreme Court recently explained that the
Norris-La Guardia Act "was enacted in response to federal court intervention on behalf of
employers through the use of injunctive powers against unions and other associations of em-
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Changed economic circumstances11 9 and political pressure12° in the
1930s highlighted the Constitution's malleability as the Court began to
relinquish control of economic policy and abandon "Lochnerism."
' 121
Institutional weakening of the Court due partly to the Lochner era, has
kept it from using the fourteenth amendment to tamper with more recent
state economic regulation. 12 2 Since the 1930s, the Court has subjected
state regulation to a less stringent standard of scrutiny, and, therefore, it
has been justifiable on less compelling grounds.
123
The lesson of Lochner should not be lost in Croson. Since Lochner,
Justice Brennan has conceded that the Court's intrusion into economic
matters comes at a high price. 24 Furthermore, the Court has recognized
that its legitimacy comes only from pronouncements grounded in the
words or ideals of the Constitution.1 25 The Court did not insist on color-
ployees." Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702,
715 (1982) (citations omitted).
Then, as now, the Court maintained its philosophy and control of national economic
policy, deeming that the Constitution prohibited legislation which inhibited freedom of con-
tract. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (enjoining union from
persuading employees to join union and upholding employee agreement with employer not to
join union as freedom to contract); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Red Jacket Con-
sol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927) (restraining union employees from persuad-
ing non-union coal mine operators from breaking employment contracts).
119. The country was recovering from the Great Depression, and New Deal initiatives were
taking shape. The Great Depression's beginning can be traced to the stock market crash of
1929 and its ending be traced to the start of World War II in 1939. 5 THE NEW ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA BRITANNICA 443 (15th ed. 1988). However, the American economy had gradually
begun to recover from the ills of the Great Depression since the late 1930s. L. VALENTINE &
C. DAUTEN, BUSINEss CYCLES AND FORECASTING 36 (1983); see also Keyserling, The New
Deal and Its Current Significance In Re National Economic and Social Policy, 59 WASH. L.
REv. 795, 796-97 (1984).
120. President Roosevelt faced with a Court predisposed against his New Deal initiatives,
attempted to reconstitute that body by proposing the addition of one justice for each justice
that was at least seventy years old and had ten years of service. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES &
PRESIDENTS 208 (2d ed. 1985). This act heightened the Court's awareness that a coordinate
branch of government was not going to leave any stone unturned in its attempt to limit the
Court's excursions into the economic policy arena. Id. It is very likely that this event was
partly responsible for the Court's charting of a new course soon thereafter. Id.
121. See, eg., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (employers cannot
restrain or coerce employees from exercising their fundamental rights to organize and select a
representative).
122. Since Lochner, there has been only one such determination. See Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957), overruled in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 472 U.S. 297 (1976).
123. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
124. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 62 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("this Court should have learned long ago that the Constitution - be it through the Contract
or Due Process Clause - can actively intrude into... economic and policy matters only if my
Brethren are prepared to bear enormous institutional and social costs").
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and
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blind criteria to dethrone official segregation, 126 and the use of such crite-
ria to defeat set-aside programs, therefore, is hypocritical. Set asides
present an opportunity for the Court to uphold the fourteenth amend-




Before emancipation, most states had laws severely curtailing the
types of businesses in which blacks could engage. For example, some
southern states prohibited blacks from engaging in businesses that re-
quired "competitive skills."' 128 Upon the emancipation of blacks, white
entrepreneurs had to compete with freed blacks entering into business.
Yet, despite the freedom achieved through emancipation, blacks were
subject to discriminatory laws'29 and processes130 that ensured their ex-
clusion from the marketplace. Blacks were, therefore, forced to compete
in an "illegal" free market-in businesses associated with subservient sta-
tus.' 3' Today, more than a century later, businesses owned by both
whites and blacks continue to receive certain protection in the market-
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.").
126. See, eg., Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (city did not consider any race-neutral means to
increase minority business participation). Color-blindness was relegated to the status of dis-
sent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it is virtually impossible to get beyond racism without consideration of
race).
128. R. RANSOM & R. SUTCH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM 36 (1977) (discussing post-1865
South Carolina requirement that black artisans purchase licenses, while whites were ex-
empted); see also Bates, The Potential of Black Capitalism, 21 PuB. POL. 135 (1973).
129. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873):
Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States in the legislative
bodies which claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal government,
were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and
curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an extent that
their freedom was of little value .... They were in some States forbidden to appear in
the towns in any other character than menial servants. They were required to reside
on and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it. They were excluded
from many occupations of gain....
1d
130. Craft unionism was an effective tool for excluding blacks from acquiring trade skills
which served as a stepping stone to entrepreneurship. See R. RANSOM & R. SUTCH, supra
note 128, at 31-39.
131. See generally A. HARRIS, THE NEGRO AS CAPITALIST, A Study of Banking and Busi-
ness Among American Negroes 9-13 (1968) (businesses such as barbershop/beauty parlor op-
eration, cooking, cleaning, and shoe shine and repair were avoided by white entrepreneurs and
deemed more suitable for individuals with skills and personality traits of a servient class).
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place, albeit on more creative and democratic grounds. The following
subsections discuss such protection. -
A. Antitrust Legislation
Experience teaches us that if businesses were left to pure market
competition without any interfering legislation, the entrepreneurial land-
scape would look quite different. 132 Early in this country's history, the
federal government recognized this and responded with antitrust legisla-
tion. 133 The pressing concern that led to the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act over a century ago was that small enterprises could be
crushed by larger businesses, resulting in great inequality of wealth and
opportunity.134 Congress feared that the country would suffer if its pow-
ers of production and economic affairs were controlled by only a few
people. 35 Congress followed up on the economic opportunity issue with
subsequent legislation such as the Clayton Act, 136 the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 137 and the Robinson-Patman Act. 38 These pro-com-
petition legislative initiatives have continually received strong support
from the Court'39 despite the fact that their constitutional foundation
132. See infra note 134.
133. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 64.7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
134. See 21 CONG. REC. 2598 (1890). Senator George stated:
These evils have grown within the last few years to an enormous magnitude; enor-
mous also in their numbers. They cover nearly all the great branches of trade and of
production in which our country is interested. They grow out of the present ten-
dency of economic affairs throughout the world. It is a sad thought to the philan-
thropist that the present system of production and of exchange is having that
tendency which is sure at some not very distant day to crush out all small men, all
small capitalists, all small enterprises. This is being done now. We find everywhere
over our land the wrecks of small, independent enterprises thrown in our pathway.
So now the American Congress and the American people are brought face to face
with this sad, this great problem. Is production, is trade, to be taken away from the
great mass of the people and concentrated in the hands of a few men who, I am
obliged to add, by the policies pursued by our Government, have been enabled to
aggregate to themselves large, enormous fortunes?
Id. During the debates on this issue, Senator Sherman further elaborated:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and
among them all none is more threatening than the inequality of condition, of wealth,
and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the concentration
of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to break down
competition.
Id. at 2460.
135. See id. at 2460.
136. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988)).
137. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988)).
138. Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a
(1988)).
139. In United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
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may not be as solid and compelling as the fourteenth amendment is for
affirmative action.14
mem., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), the court strongly reaffirmed the pro-competition principles of
the Sherman Act as well as the Act's constitutional foundation under the commerce clause in
the highly publicized breakup of AT&T. See id. More recently, in California v. American
Stores, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990), the Clayton Act was reinvigorated by a holding that section 16
of that Act can be used by states and consumers to challenge anti-competitive mergers. Id. at
1866-67 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1973)), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988)). Similarly, in
Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990), the Court found that the Robinson-Patman Act
prohibited manufacturers from discounting merchandise to wholesalers and not retailers when
such discounts have no relationship to costs incurred by the manufacturer or wholesaler. Id. at
2514-42.
The Court's reaffirmation of competitive opportunity principles is particularly notable in
light of continuing federal initiatives that limit or dilute antitrust legislation in order to facili-
tate global competition. See, eg., Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290,
96 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4053 (1988)) (granting broad antitrust
immunity when anti-competitive effects of activity essentially only occurs abroad); National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)) (lessening standard for evaluating research and development
ventures and reducing damage limit for civil actions); Cooperative Productivity and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1989, H.R. 423, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.; National Cooperative Innovation and
Commercialization Act of 1989, H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Despite contentions
by American companies that they need to join forces in order to survive international competi-
tion, the Court has stayed its course on antitrust principles. See United States v. Ivaco, Inc.,
704 F. Supp. 1409, 1427-28 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (enjoining merger that would have resulted in
70% control of market for railroad tamping equipment and rejecting contention that merger
was necessary to compete in Europe). These principles are equally applicable when the compe-
tition is between local concerns in different states. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (rejecting contention that consolidation justifiable because anti-
competitive effects fell on out-of-state banks). Concerns about harm to innocent victims, stig-
matization, stereotyping and the like, were not articulated as constitutionally limiting factors
by the Court. See id. The economic impact of these decisions, however, greatly exceeds the
reach or potential of all set-aside programs combined. This results because set-aside programs
represent a small percentage of American contracting dollars. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 459 (1980) ("in the year 1976 less than 1% of all federal procurement was
concluded with minority business enterprises, although minorities comprised 15-18% of the
population"). Hearings, supra note 4 (unpublished testimony of Parren Mitchell, "minority
business participation remained fixed at about 1/10 of 1%" between 1972 and 1987), while
antitrust decisions affect the economic vitality of all small business. If large numbers of major-
ity small businesses were forced to close because of inability to compete with trusts, the resul-
tant economic impact would logically be even greater.
140. The goals of the framers of the fourteenth amendment were, in general, to guarantee
certain civil liberties against government action; to apply these liberties to all citizens equally;
to give Congress wide power to expand civil rights and enforce the amendment; and to make
the federal government the guarantor of individual civil rights. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. No-
WAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 18.72, at 378-79 (1986). The opportunity for material self-development can, consequently,
be traced directly to the fourteenth amendment and its purposes. Antitrust law, on the other
hand, has its genesis in the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 183 (1908); Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 197, 337 (1904). This constitutional provision gives Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and has been interpreted to provide the basis
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B. The Small Business Act
Congress also demonstrated its willingness to protect small, major-
ity-owned businesses by enacting the Small Business Act.141 Recogniz-
ing the special survival and competitive needs of small majority
businesses, Congress stepped in with assistance.14 The congressional
findings which triggered "protective" legislation for majority firms are
identical in many respects with its findings that support the 8(a) program
of the Small Business Act, minus, of course, the element of discrimina-
tion on the basis of race.14 3 Spurned by complaints of small, majority
businesspersons, Congress examined the federal procurement process
and concluded that:
Small business is the bulwark of free competitive enterprise
.... Congress recognizes the importance of small business to
our free competitive economy and in this bill declares as its
policy-that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and
protect insofar as is possible the interest of small business con-
cerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to ensure
that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for
supplies and services for the Government be placed with small
business enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall
economy of the Nation. 144
These principles should also serve to justify similar protection for minori-
ties and have been regarded as consistent with the democratic principles
upon which this country was founded.
145
for regulating monopolies and other trade practices through the necessary and proper clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Washington Brewer Inst. v. United States, 137 F.2d 964 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 776 (1943). This use of "implied" versus apparent power to legis-
late in a specific area, places antitrust analysis in the penumbra. See Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367, 372 (1875). Affirmative action schemes, however, are directly traceable to the four-
teenth amendment. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
141. Pub. L. No. 85-536, 92 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-650
(1988)).
142. See H.R. REP. No. 494, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, 2020, 2020-22.
143. Problems such as limited working capital, difficulty obtaining bonding and lack of
experience plague most small firms. See id at 2-3, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 2021-22.
144. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2022.
145. 21 CONG. REC. 2547 (1890).
If the concentered powers of this combination are entrusted to a single man, it is a
kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to
strong resistance of the State and national authorities. If anything is wrong this is
wrong. If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king
over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If we
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C. The Buy American Act
Majority businesspersons receive further protection from the Buy
American Act.146 Regulations promulgated pursuant to this legislation
subject foreign bidders to a six or twelve percent surcharge 47 when pur-
suing government procurement 148 and construction 149 projects, thereby
increasing the competitive edge of domestic entrepreneurs over foreign
businesses. Domestic entrepreneurs have attempted to broaden this pre-
serve through self-serving interpretations of the Act. 150 Although the for-
would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with
power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.
Id. (emphasis added). To highlight the magnitude of abuse and the need for action, Senator
Sherman also played on America's worst fears. He stated:
Sir, now the people of the United States as well as of other countries are feeling the
power and grasp of these combinations, and are demanding of every Legislature and
of Congress a remedy for this evil, only grown into huge proportions in recent times.
They had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never before such giants as in our
day. You must heed their appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the
nihilist. Society is now disturbed by forces never felt before.
Id. at 2460.
146. 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10c (1987). The Act was a product of the depression, and designed
to foster and protect American industry, workers, and invested capital. See 76 CONG. REC.
1896 (1933) (statement of Rep. Eaton).
147. See 41 U.S.C. § 10a.
148. 41 U.S.C. § 10a provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and unless the head of the federal
agency concerned shall determine it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the
cost to be unreasonable, only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies
as have been mined or produced in the United States, and only such manufactured
articles, materials, and supplies as have been manufactured in the United States sub-
stantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured,
as the case may be, in the United States, shall be acquired for public use. This sec-
tion shall not apply with respect to articles, materials, or supplies for use outside the
United States, or if articles, materials, or supplies of the class or kind to be used or
the articles, materials, or supplies from which they are manufactured are not mined,
produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States in sufficient and
reasonably available commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality.
149. Ia § 10b(a). This section provides:
Every contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or
public work in the United States growing out of an appropriation heretofore made or
hereafter to be made shall contain a provision that in the performance of the work
the contractor, subcontractors, material men, or suppliers, shall use only such un-
manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or produced in the
United States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have
been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or
supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States
except as provided in section lOg of this title: Provided, however, that if the head of
the federal agency making the contract shall find in respect to some particular arti-
cles, materials, or supplies it is impracticable to make such requirement or that it
would unreasonably increase the cost, an exception shall be noted in the specifica-
tions as to that particular article, material, or supply, and a public record made of the
findings which justified the exception.
Id
150. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin, 635 F.2d 248 (3d. Cir. 1980). In this case,
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eign business surcharge might result in inefficient procurement or higher
contract costs, the procuring agency's decision will be upheld as long as
it is rational."'5 The light burden of rationality applied to preference pro-
grams, as opposed to strict scrutiny applied to set-aside programs,15 2 fur-
ther immunizes preference programs from court challenges.
IV. THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY
This country was founded on democratic principles, and its laws
should reflect that foundation.' 53 Minority firms' employees represent. a
significant portion of the nation's labor force.'54 These firms, through
their employees, provide meaningful contributions to the production of
goods and services in our economy.' 5 5
a company subject to the Buy American Act was awarded a contract for the construction of a
power plant because its bid was lower than Allis-Chalmers' even after a six percent surcharge
was added. Id at 249-50. Allis-Chalmers contended that the "entire" bid price was controlled
by the Act, and the 12% surcharge was applicable since its firm was located in a labor surplus
area. Id. at 243-54. The court adopted an administrative finding that Allis-Chalmers was
located not in the city represented but, rather in a nearby township which did not have sub-
stantial unemployment, thereby making the imposition of a 12% surcharge inappropriate. Id
at 252-53. Further, the court found that Allis-Chalmers' construction of the Executive Order
and implementing regulations governing bid price under the Act ignored clear mandates in the
Act. Id at 254. Specifically, the court noted that implementing regulations and the Executive
Order require that surcharges be applied on a line-by-line basis, that post delivery expenses be
excluded, and that foreign bids be separated into taxable and non-taxable categories. Id at
254-55. Another court held that the Navy's failure to grant an American contractor a waiver
of domestic buying requirements was an abuse of discretion, when the contractor could not
obtain materials domestically at the price originally submitted in his bid. John C. Grimberg
Co. v. United States, 869 F.2d 1475, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
151. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 635 F.2d at 253; Sea-Land Serv. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 435 (3d
Cir. 1979).
152. See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
153. Notwithstanding the shortsightedness of the framers who compromised the rights of
blacks on political and economic grounds in order to reach middle ground with the representa-
tives of slave states, W. JORDON, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO 323-24 (1968), the preamble to the Constitution and many of its amendments suggest
that the foundational base for affirmative action programs is strongly embedded in our laws.
See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 556-57 (3d ed. 1986);
W. JORDAN, supra, at 322-25. The preamble of the Constitution provides:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. preamble.
154. See Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs on S. 1235 to Amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statement of Senator Paul Simon) (transcript
on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Senator Simon stated that, for example,
"[a]pproximately 7,200 to 10,800 new jobs were created from 1985 through 1988 through
Chicago's minority business set-aside program." Id
155. See id. In noting the findings of a study commissioned by Chicago's mayor, Richard
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Under ideal circumstances, or in a race-neutral society, 156 private
sector contracting would be a viable option. In our less than ideal soci-
ety, however, this option is fraught with overwhelming difficulties. The
Supreme Court opinions suggest, however, that the Court is not looking
for a way to give its imprimatur to DBE programs, but rather it is con-
vinced that such programs have run their course and are no longer
needed. 157
A. Metro Broadcasting-Too Little, Too Late
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 158 is the first case in which a
majority of the Court held that "benign"1 9 racial classifications are sub-
ject to the same demanding standard of review as "invidious" classifica-
tions.16" Croson created disagreement in the courts of appeals as to
whether non-remedial benign racial classifications are permissible. 61 In
Daley, to study that city's set-aside goals, Senator Simon stated, "The Blue Ribbon Panel also
found significant economic benefits to minority and women owned-businesses, to their commu-
nities, and to the City of Chicago itself." Id.
156. Even if the legacy of slavery and discrimination were disregarded and business oppor-
tunities for minorities were assessed in contemporary times, it would not be difficult to find a
dearth of opportunities and the likelihood of failure would still be great. See, e.g., Hearings,
supra note 4 (testimony of Mr. Parren Mitchell). Even firms with proven track records are
unable to secure work in the private sector. Id. In fact, firms that successfully perform with
majority firms on public sector work are almost never associated with in the future on non-
affirmative action projects. Id. Even when minority participation is required, some firms will
go to great lengths to secure a waiver of minority inclusion, notwithstanding the availability of
competent firms. Id. Discriminatory banking and bonding practices of majority institutions
only serve to aggravate an already pathetic situation. See id. (testimony of E. Mitchell, Sr.,
founder and former President of E. Mitchell Construction Co.).
157. See, eg., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 1842 (1986).
158. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
159. Benign racial classifications are classifications having legitimate, nondiscriminatory
purposes. Id. at 470, 490-91; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978).
160. Comment, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.- A Response
to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 156 (1989). An invidious classification is one
based on offensive, unfair discriminatory motives. Croson, 488 U.S. at 526-27.
161. Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom.,
Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990); see Winter
Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Metro Broad-
casting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). Winter Park Communications involved a challenge to
the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) use of "qualitative enhancement" criteria
for minority ownership when awarding broadcasting licenses. 873 F.2d at 349-50. A majority
station owner contended that these criteria violated the fifth amendment's equal protection
mandate. Id at 352. A panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded that non-remedial benign racial
classifications were still permissible after Croson. Id. at 353. The Court reached a different
result in Shurberg Broadcasting, which involved a challenge to an FCC distress sale program
that favored minorities. 876 F.2d at 910. In that case, it was also contended that these pro-
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addition, the Croson decision brought to focus, but left open, judicial
analysis of programs that are funded by both federal and state monies.
Justice O'Connor suggested that Congress could require or authorize fed-
eral niinority programs which the states could not require or authorize
by themselves.162 Because many local programs across the country re-
ceive federal assistance with the requirement that they establish racial
preferences, 163 lower courts must resolve whether Fulilove v. Klutz-
nick, 1  which involved a remedial federally funded program, or Croson,
which involved a remedial state funded program, applies in determining
the constitutionality of federally supported state programs.
In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,65 the Court only addressed the per-
missibility of non-remedial classifications. 66 After assessing two FCC
policies which gave preference to racial minorities in awarding licenses to
broadcasters,1 61 the Court held that the standards outlined in Croson did
not apply to benign racial classifications in federal laws.1 68 The case fo-
cused not on minority entrepreneurship in broadcasting but, rather, on
diversity in media programming, which is partly achieved through mi-
grams violated fifth amendment rights. Id Another D.C. Circuit panel held that racial classi-
fications can only be justified when used for remedial purposes or in an educational setting. Id
at 912.
162. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91. "We do not... find in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
some form of federal pre-emption in matters of race. We simply note what should be apparent
to all-section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment stemmed from distrust of state legislative
enactments based on race .... " Id. at 491.
163. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-4.2 (1990) (contractor's compliance with executive order and
the regulations in 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-4 (1990) shall be based on its implementation of equal
opportunity clause, specific affirmative action obligations required by specifications set forth in
41 C.F.R. 60-4.3(a) and its efforts to meet goals); id. § 60-4.5(a) (a contractor participating,
either individually or through an association, in approved Hometown Plan, including highway
affirmative action plans, shall comply with its affirmative action obligations under Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) by complying with its obligations under the plan); id.
§ 60-5.2(a) (under the equal opportunity clause contained in Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees or
applicants for employment because of religion or national origin, and must take affirmative
action to insure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employ-
ment without regard to their religion or national origin).
164. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
165. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
166. See id. at 3002.
167. Id at 3004-05. Under its minority ownership policy, the FCC considered minority
ownership and participation in management a positive factor when conducting comparative
hearings to award licenses. Id. The second factor, generally referred to as the distress sale
policy, allowed minorities to purchase licenses that are in jeopardy of revocation, at a reduced
rate. Id. at 3005.
168. Id. at 3009-10. The Court specifically noted that the FCC policies were not designed to
assist victims of discrimination, but to promote programming diversity. Id. at 3010.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
nority ownership.1 69 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan noted that:
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress--even
if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being
designed to compensate victims of past governmental or socie-
tal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the ex-
tent they serve important governmental objectives within the
power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. 170
Noting that the FCC policies were not entirely remedial, but rather
geared towards promoting programming diversity, the Court concluded
that diversity sufficed as an important governmental objective.1 71 There-
after, the Court focused on whether the ownership policies were substan-
tially related to the achievement of that objective.
172
Viewed in its most positive light, Metro Broadcasting represents a
victory for minorities because it provides strong reaffirmation of Fullilove
and Congress' broad powers to institute race-conscious schemes. The
Metro Broadcasting decision was not, however, a wholesale victory for
minorities. It also reaffirmed some of the principles enunciated in
Croson, that act as major impediments to minority contractors. Metro
Broadcasting reiterated that states will be judged by less deferential stan-
dards than Congress in enacting benign discrimination legislation. 173 It
also reaffirmed Croson's holding that race-neutral alternatives must be
considered prior to establishing or approving an affirmative action pro-
gram,174 that a program must be narrowly tailored in extent and dura-
tion, 17  and innocent victims cannot be unduly burdened by the
program.' 76 Therefore, after Metro Broadcasting, states and local gov-
ernments still must satisfy the Croson standards that have eviscerated
minority contracting.
77
169. Id. at 3012-13.
170. Id. at 3008-09.
171. Id at 3010.
172. Id.
173. Id at 3009. "With respect to this 'complex' empirical question... we are required to
give 'great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the commission.'" Id. at
3011 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973)).
174. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019; Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. In Metro Broadcast-
ing, the Court found that three attempts at race-neutral alternatives had failed. 110 S. Ct. at
3022-23.
175. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3024 (tailoring was achieved through periodic re-
view of policies, continual hearings, annual reports to Congress and judicial review); Croson,
488 U.S. at 509-10.
176. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3025-26; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10.
177. See supra notes 75-100 and accompanying text for a general discussion of Croson.
[Vol. 24:655
April 1991] CROSON AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 683
For minority entrepreneurs, Metro Broadcasting's standards are not
helpful. It technically assures that affirmative action is not dead, yet it
simultaneously creates negligible opportunities for economic empower-
ment and impact. 178 In addition, the prospect that the decision will be
narrowly interpreted and limited to the broadcast industry remains an
open question. 179 Moreover, the increasingly conservative ideology rep-
resented on the Supreme Court will probably further limit Metro Broad-
casting.18 0 Despite the Croson Court's deference to federal initiatives,81
some federally funded programs are still being challenged.'82 Metro
Broadcasting did not address programs jointly funded by federal and
state or local governments. As previously noted, in many instances, fed-
eral funds are tied to a requirement that race-based measures must be
used to remedy the effects of discrimination.'83 Since Croson requires
specific findings by states prior to implementing their programs, 184 states
piggybacking on federal findings have been hauled into court on the basis
of violating Croson. For example, in Cone Corp. v. Florida Department of
178. See Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3025-26.
179. The Court specifically noted that it was not dealing with fixed quantity set-asides.
Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3027. In addition, future challengers to government minor-
ity business programs will be able to distinguish Metro Broadcasting because of its reliance on
first amendment interests in diversity. Id at 3010-11.
180. This is due to Justice Brennan's resignation and four other justices' deep-seated oppo-
sition to any affirmative action plans that are not remedial. See id at 3028 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., joined in dissent). Support from Justice
White also seems limited to instances where programs are established or supported by Con-
gress. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 476. Although Justice Souter is a self-portrayed supporter of
broad affirmative action schemes, S. ExEc. REP. No. 32, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1990),
state and local initiatives remain in jeopardy until his vote in a future case confirms his declara-
tion of support.
181. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
182. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 825 F.2d 334 (11th Cir. 1987),
vacated, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989) (mem.) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Croson); Ten-
nessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, No. 3-85-1176, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. June 14, 1990); Cone Corp.
v. Florida Dep't of Transp., No. 88-40042, slip op. (N.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 1989).
183. See, eg., 41 C.F.R. § 604.2 (1990) (contractor's compliance with executive order and
regulations in 41 C.F.R. part 60-4 shall be based on its implementation of equal opportunity
clause, specific affirmative action obligations required by specifications set forth in 41 C.F.R.
60-4.3(a) and its efforts to meet goals); id § 604.5(a) (contractor participating, either individ-
ually or through association, in approved Hometown Plan, including highway affirmative ac-
tion plans, shall comply with its affirmative action obligations under Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) by complying with its obligations under plan); id. § 60-5.2(a) (under
equal opportunity clause contained in Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) as
amended, employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees or applicants for
employment because of religion or national origin, and must take affirmative action to insure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment without re-
gard to their religion or national origin). See also supra note 163 and accompanying text.
184. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
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Transportation,'85 a Florida district court granted summary judgment to
majority contractors who attacked the state's ten percent Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise goal for highway construction. 186 The court did not
apply Croson, however, because the contracts involved federal funds.
1 87
Likewise, in H.K. Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County,'88 the Court,
in granting certiorari, vacated and remanded, in light of Croson, the
Eleventh Circuit's determination that the county did not have to make
additional findings of discrimination in order to participate in federal
funding for highway construction. 8 9 Other federal courts have con-
cluded that states need not go through the ritual of making specific find-
ings but can rely on congressiona determinations that remediation
should occur when federal funding is involved. In Tennessee Asphalt Co.
v. Farris," a Tennessee district court ruled that:
A state which acts according to congressionally-determined
specifications to administer a project induced by congressio-
nally-approved funding is not acting independently in the sense
that should raise constitutional implications .... Since it is
apparent that a state would be shielded from constitutional at-
tack if it simply enacted findings reiterating those of Congress
word for word, why should the states not be allowed to rely on
the congressional findings openly-as opposed to doing the
same thing by going through an inane ritual?' 9'
The Tennessee Asphalt court also cited with approval another case,
Milwaukee County Pavers Association v. Fiedler,9 1 which held that Fulli-
love controlled jointly funded programs, and that a state need not make
separate findings of fact to support its set-aside program. 93 In Milwau-
kee County Pavers, the court had reasoned that the state should be re-
garded as a subsidiary element of the federal initiative when it uses race-
conscious measures in order to receive federal funding.' 94
Until the Supreme Court hears such a case, lower court challenges
185. No. 88-40042, slip op. (N.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 1989).
186. lId
187. Id
188. 489 U.S. 1062 (1989) (mem.).
189. H.K. Porter Co., 825 F.2d at 331. The Eleventh Circuit reached this conclusion based
on the fact that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978 required that recipients of
federal funds institute affirmative action plans. Id. at 325.
190. No. 3-85-1176, slip op. (M.D. Tenn. June 14, 1990).
191. Id. at 9.
192. 710 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1989).
193. Tennessee Asphalt Co., No. 3-85-1176, slip op. at 10 (citing Milwaukee County Pavers
Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F. Supp. 1532, 1546 (W.D. Wis. 1989)).
194. Milwaukee County Pavers, 710 F. Supp. at 1545.
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will continue to explore the distinction between federally mandated pro-
grams imposed on a state, and programs voluntarily created by a state to
secure federal funds. Metro Broadcasting suggests that generalized ob-
servations by Congress will support a federal program.1 9 5 The extent to
which deference to congressional findings can serve as the predicate for
state and local programs, however, remains to be seen.
V. CONGRESS AS A SOLUTION
In light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to authorize affirmative
action programs, Congress is viewed as the proper alternate forum for
addressing minority concerns. After all, it was congressional initiative
that served as a catalyst for state and local minority set-aside programs in
the first place.196 Moreover, Congress has at times stepped in to prevent
injustice when the Court has set legal or constitutional standards higher
than minorities could hurdle to advance their cause in the courts.
1 9 7
During the Lochner era, Congress was instrumental in responding to ju-
dicial insensitivity to marketplace needs. 19 Congress, however, has been
a curious ally. Although at times Congress has stepped in to prohibit
discriminatory practices, 199 it has failed to intervene at other times when
its assistance was badly needed.2°" Nonetheless, the latest affirmative ac-
tion decisions have so affected the disadvantaged that minorities have
turned to Congress for refuge.2 "1 Given the unpopularity of set-aside pro-
195. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3027-28.
196. See, e.g., Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1988)).
197. For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court rejected a class action suit by
negro citizens challenging the city's at-large electoral system as violative of the fifteenth
amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 446 U.S. 55, 65, 74
(1980). For both amendments the Court stated that plaintiffs must prove purposeful discrimi-
nation and that a showing of disproportionate effects was not sufficient to establish a claim of
unconstitutional vote dilution. Id. at 66, 70. In response, Congress amended the Voting
Rights Act of 1982 to provide that "effects" were sufficient for proving such cases. Voting
Rights Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)); see SEN. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1982). This
amendment was upheld by the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
198. See, e.g., Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988)); Norris-La Guardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-68, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988)); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
199. See, eg., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2003-17 (1988)) (prohibiting discrimination through use of
commerce power).
200. For example, Congress never legislated to outlaw or regulate slavery. Instead slavery
was outlawed by constitutional amendment. U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
201. One of the strategies employed by the Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights Under
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grams in many quarters, 202 reliance on Congress for relief remains a
questionable proposition. Timing sometimes becomes crucial in gaining
support and assistance from Congress.20 3 In any event, substantial data
exist which demonstrate that internally the country is at a critical stage
with respect to opportunities for minorities and immediate remedial re-
Law, to respond to recent decisions, is political lobbying. See, eg., Memorandum from Bar-
bara R. Arnwine, Executive Director Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to
Supporters of the 1990 Civil Rights Act (Nov. 5, 1990) (discussing past efforts of group to pass
1990 Civil Rights Act and future efforts necessary to pass 1991 Civil Rights Act). That organ-
ization promoted a legislative lobbying network intended to pressure delegates, congressper-
sons and senators into taking action by voting to support legislation which would establish
laws that will restore the vitality of civil rights legislation. See id. On February 8, 1990, a
bipartisan group of legislators introduced a bill titled "Civil Rights Act of 1990," which
sought to remedy or overturn the latest decisions that have eviscerated job discrimination laws.
See H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The intent of the Bill was to shift the burden of
proof back to employers and to curtail lawsuits challenging court approved consent decrees.
Id. at 3. The bill focuses on decisions such as Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989) (holding that the Civil Rights Law of 1866 covers racial harassment in hiring but not on
the job); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that the employee
has the burden of showing the impact of each employment practice and how it caused discrim-
ination, while the employer's only burden is to produce subjective hiring and promotion crite-
ria justifying its decision); and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing white
firefighters to challenge consent decree between city and group of black firefighters). The bill,
however, did not directly address the legality of affimative action programs and was attacked
by the Bush administration as being too broad, and as establishing quotas. See, e.g., Memo-
randum from Barbara R. Arnwine, supra, at 1. See also Moore, After the Marching, NA-
TIONAL JOURNAL, June 23, 1990, at 1525. Although the bill was approved in both Houses of
Congress, it was vetoed by the President. 136 CONG. Rc. S16562-02 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law has resolved to reintroduce the bill at
the beginning of Congress' next term. Memorandum from Barbara R. Arnwine, supra, at 1.
As planned, a new bill was introduced on January 3, 1991, titled the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 137 CONG. REc. H53-01 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991).
On May 8, 1990, a series of hearings began to respond to the Supreme Court decision in
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See Hearings, supra note 4.
202. In addition to Croson, district courts in several jurisdictions have struck down set-
aside plans favoring minority business enterprises. See, eg., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n
v. Fiedler, 707 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (held contractors were likely to succeed on
claim that statute was unconstitutional in absence of evidence of prior discrimination); Con-
tractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (city's reserva-
tion of certain contracts for bidding only by disadvantaged businesses held violative of equal
protection).
203. Many of the efforts to promote and protect small businesses were triggered by wartime
conditions. For example, the Smaller War Plants Corporation was created to effectively incor-
porate small businesses into the war material production process for World War II. See Act of
June 11, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-603, ch. 404, § 4(f)(4), 56 Stat. 351, 354 (1942) (expired 1946).
Again in 1951, the Small Defense Plants Administration was created as a result of the Korean
War. See Act of July 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-96, cl. 275, § 714 (b)(1) (B), (C), 65 Stat. 131,
140 (1951) (repealed 1966). This agency attempted to assist small businesses in obtaining
prime contracts which they typically had been unable to obtain due to circumstances such as
lack of a track record, capital, bonding, etc. Id.
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sponses are necessary.2°4
The constitutional and economic magnitude of the Court's decision
in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 205 is tremendous. Although only a
small window of opportunity for minorities remains at the federal level,
the weight of authority suggests that the federal government alone can-
not ensure equal opportunity for minorities.20 6 We need a substantial
national commitment to democratic ideals supported by both Congress
and the Court.2 "7 To say that Congress has greater discretion than states
to remedy the effects of past discrimination is to engage in legal calisthen-
204. See 1988 Comm. on the Cities, "The Kerner Report Twenty Years Later" (Mar. 1,
1988) (unpublished report available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review office). A summary
provided in this report stated:
Poverty is worse now than it was twenty years ago .... Overall unemployment in
America is twice what it was twenty years ago. And unemployment for blacks is
now twice what it is for whites .... There is a large and growing urban underclass in
America... principally blacks and Hispanics in the central cities. They are more
economically isolated, more socially alienated, than ever before .... There are
"quiet riots" in all of America's central cities: unemployment, poverty, social disor-
ganization, segregation, family disintegration, housing and school deterioration, and
crime are worse now ....
Id
205. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
206. In Croson, Justice O'Connor noted that greater deference will be afforded the federal
government in providing race conscious relief. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91 (citing Bohrer,
Bakke, Weber and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND. L.J. 473, 512-13 (1981)). O'Connor went on to suggest that
states would get similar deference if their programs were either authorized or mandated by the
federal government. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491. This limited approach is one of convenience for
the Court since it was probably not ready to take on Congress, and fully recognized that the
federal government funds many local programs and requires the establishment of racial prefer-
ences as a condition of such funding. See, eg., supra note 163. Even if the Court was willing
to respond by defering to all federal programs and state programs authorized or required by
the federal government, this would be an insufficient response. The Report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders noted and emphasized the need for a national response
which includes commitment at both public and private levels. See NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVIsORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 230 (1968). The Commission noted that "the need is not so much for the
Government to design new programs as it is for unions, the churches, the foundations, the
universities-all our urban institutions-must deepen their involvement." Id. Moreover, the
Commission's Advisory Panel On Private Enterprise noted:
We conclude that maximum utilization of the tremendous capability of the Amer-
ican free enterprise system is a crucial element in any program for improving condi-
tions in both our urban centers and rural poverty areas, which have brought us to the
present crisis... Mhe private sector is the mainspring of the national economy and
consequently of the economic well-being of our citizens. Free enterprise, with its
system of incentives and rewards for hard work, ability, ingenuity and creativity, has
made this nation strong and produced the highest standard of living the world has
ever known.
Id. at 313 (emphasis in original).
207. Recent interpretations of Civil Rights Laws have been appropriately characterized as
"cramped," Croson, 488 U.S. at 560 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and "pinched .... [thereby]
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ics. Whether the legislative actor is federal, state, or local, legislatures
enacting affirmative action programs are attempting to aid Americans
who have suffered discrimination for hundreds of years. There is no
valid basis for precluding all actors from relying on the same data as the
Supreme Court did in Croson.2°0 Minority political empowerment with
its concomitant expansion of economic opportunity for minorities2° 9
should not overwhelm us with thoughts of racial politics. 210 The fact
that whites in power have discriminated against blacks or other minori-
ties in favor of whites, should not lead to the inevitable conclusion that if
blacks were politically empowered they would similarly discriminate
against whites in favor of blacks or other minorities.21 Such reasoning is
clearly misplaced. It is doubtful that the majoritarian power structure
would tolerate an allocation of benefits that excluded it, much less allow
such schemes to endure. This has been demonstrated even in instances
where the favorable allocation has been made by whites for the benefit of
norities.2 12
VI. CONCLUSION
The multiplicity of state and local set-aside programs plus congres-
sional initiatives should have sensitized the Supreme Court to the need
ignoring powerful historical evidence about the Reconstruction Congress' concerns." Patter-
son, 109 S. Ct. at 2379.
208. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488-89. To analyze discrimination on the basis of broad federal,
versus narrow state remedial, power is to duck the issue. There can be no basis for differentiat-
ing the kind of data on which the program sponsor can rely in order to remedy discrimination.
Such differentiation suggests a lack of seriousness about providing a remedy. As Justice Mar-
shall's dissent noted, "No principle of federalism or of federal power, however, forbids a state
or local government from drawing upon a nationally relevant historical record prepared by the
Federal Government." Id. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209. Bates, Black Political Empowerment and Economic Advancement, Focus, May 1989,
at 5 (periodical published by the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington, D.C.).
Upon studying black businesses in cities with black mayors, Bates found that more procure-
ment activities are targeted to such businesses and they tend to flourish in comparison to cities
that do not have black mayors. Id. at 5, 6. Black firms also tended to be larger, have more
employees and lower business failure rates in such cities with presiding black mayors. Id. at 6.
210. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
211. See Bates, supra note 209. This belief was probably triggered by the fact that many
cities that have mayors from a minority group, or city councils comprised predominantly of
minorities, have established affirmative action programs. Id. at 5. It is curious that these
heightened standards of behavior are only coming into fruition at a time when minorities are
beginning to make modest political gains. The logical consequence of this reasoning is the
elimination of civil rights laws. This category of rights will be no different than any other in
American jurisprudence, since a remedy will only be afforded after a current specific wrong is
proved.
212. See, eg., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (preferential policy for
minority teachers abandoned when white professors were faced with layoff if implemented).
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for racial equality through affirmative action programs. The Court
should calibrate its value system to give a democratic and accountable
response to racial discrimination and its resultant lack of opportunity for
minorities. If it does not, the Court will continue to face political2 13 and
legislative2 14 challenges as minorities search for economic democracy.
As far as minority entrepreneurs are concerned, the Court still represents
a superlegislature with respect to economic policy, causing minorities to
play a perpetual game of catch-up in Congress.2 1 Many of the im-
ponderables confronting minority small businesspersons, also confront
white small businesspersons. In each case, our system of democracy has
deceived, deprived and exploited the weak.
There has always been a great gap between the realities of life in
America and this nation's ideal of democracy for all. This gap should be
highlighted so that a consolidated national response can be garnered. As
the Court and Congress respond to majoritarian pleas for a level playing
field with foreign competitors, their sensitivity to the dilemma of minor-
ity entrepreneurs will hopefully be heightened, thereby leading to more
democratic responses.
213. The defeated nomination to the Supreme Court of Robert Bork was due partly to
democratic and minority efforts triggered by the concern that he would interpret the Constitu-
tion in a manner harmful to their interests and that of American society generally. See Ruden-
stine, Foreward, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 5, 6 (1987) (forward in symposium issue observed that
Bork nomination "sparked" concern by nation that Bork's constitutional interpretation was
too radically conservative). In opposition to Bork's confirmation, the Democratic Party noted
that he opposed virtually every legislative and judicial initiative that advanced civil rights and
the condition of American workers. 133 CONG. REc. 7599-7624 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987).
Bork's rejection is reminiscent of the rejection of Judge Parker in 1930 for his Lochnerist
intervention into labor disputes as typified by his opinion in United Mine Workers v. Red
Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839, 844, 850 (4th Cir. 1927). See Confirmation of
Honorable John Johnston Parker to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 (1930).
214. See Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1990); see also
Memorandum from Barbara R. Arnwine, supra note 201 (discussing preparation for introduc-
tion of Civil Rights Act of 1991).
215. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (local "grandfather provi-
sion" prohibiting pushcart food sales found not violative of equal protection clause); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (Missouri statute which allowed employ-
ees to miss work in order to vote not found to violate due process or equal protection clauses).
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